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Abstract
The massive spread of digital misinformation has been identified as a
major global risk and has been alleged to influence elections and threaten
democracies. Communication, cognitive, social, and computer scientists
are engaged in efforts to study the complex causes for the viral diffusion
of misinformation online and to develop solutions, while search and social
media platforms are beginning to deploy countermeasures. With few ex-
ceptions, these efforts have been mainly informed by anecdotal evidence
rather than systematic data. Here we analyze 14 million messages spread-
ing 400 thousand articles on Twitter during and following the 2016 U.S.
presidential campaign and election. We find evidence that social bots
played a disproportionate role in amplifying low-credibility content. Ac-
counts that actively spread articles from low-credibility sources are signifi-
cantly more likely to be bots. Automated accounts are particularly active
in amplifying content in the very early spreading moments, before an ar-
ticle goes viral. Bots also target users with many followers through replies
and mentions. Humans are vulnerable to this manipulation, retweeting
bots who post links to low-credibility content. Successful low-credibility
sources are heavily supported by social bots. These results suggest that
curbing social bots may be an effective strategy for mitigating the spread
of online misinformation.
1 Introduction
If you get your news from social media, as most Americans do [15], you are
exposed to a daily dose of false or misleading content — hoaxes, conspiracy the-
ories, fabricated reports, click-bait headlines, and even satire. We refer to such
content collectively as “misinformation.” The incentives are well understood:
traffic to fake news sites is easily monetized through ads [33], but political mo-
tives can be equally or more powerful [36, 42]. The massive spread of digital mis-
information has been identified as a major global risk [22]. Claims that so-called
“fake news” can influence elections and threaten democracies [16], however, are
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hard to prove [2]. Yet we have witnessed abundant demonstrations of real harm
caused by misinformation and disinformation spreading on social media, from
dangerous health decisions [21] to manipulations of the stock market [14].
A complex mix of cognitive, social, and algorithmic biases contribute to
our vulnerability to manipulation by online misinformation [27]. These include
information overload and finite attention [41], novelty of false news [57], the
selective exposure [52, 40, 39] caused by polarized and segregated online social
networks [9, 8], algorithmic popularity bias [45, 20, 37], and other cognitive
vulnerabilities such as confirmation bias and motivated reasoning [50, 26, 29].
Abuse of online information ecosystems can both exploit and reinforce these
vulnerabilites. While fabricated news are not a new phenomenon [31], the ease
with which social media can be manipulated [42] creates novel challenges and
particularly fertile grounds for sowing disinformation. Public opinion can be
influenced thanks to the low cost of producing fraudulent websites and high
volumes of software-controlled profiles or pages, known as social bots [14, 54].
These fake accounts can post content and interact with each other and with
legitimate users via social connections, just like real people [51]. Bots can tailor
misinformation and target those who are most likely to believe it, taking advan-
tage of our tendencies to attend to what appears popular, to trust information
in a social setting [25], and to trust social contacts [23]. Bots alone may not
entirely explain the success of false news, but they do contribute to it [57]. Since
earliest manifestations uncovered in 2010 [36, 42], we have seen influential bots
affect online debates about vaccination policies [14] and participate actively in
political campaigns, both in the U.S. [4] and other countries [62, 13].
The fight against online misinformation requires a grounded assessment of
the relative impact of different mechanism by which it spreads. If the problem
is mainly driven by cognitive limitations, we need to invest in news literacy
education; if social media platforms are fostering the creation of echo chambers,
algorithms can be tweaked to broaden exposure to diverse views; and if mali-
cious bots are responsible for many of the falsehoods, we can focus attention on
detecting this kind of abuse. Here we focus on gauging the latter effect. Most
of the literature about the role played by social bots in the spread of misinfor-
mation is based on anecdotal or limited evidence; a quantitative understanding
of the effectiveness of misinformation-spreading attacks based on social bots is
still missing. A large-scale, systematic analysis of the spread of low-credibility
content by social bots is now feasible thanks to two tools developed in our lab:
the Hoaxy platform to track the online spread of claims [47] and the Botometer
machine learning algorithm to detect social bots [54]. Here we examine social
bots and how they promote this class of content spreading through millions of
Twitter posts during and following the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign.
2 Results
Our analysis is based on a large corpus of news stories posted on Twitter. Rather
than focusing on individual stories that have been flagged as misinformation by
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fact-checkers, we track the complete production of a number of sources known
to fact-checkers for their low credibility. There are two reasons for this ap-
proach [27]. First, these sources have intent and processes for the deception
and manipulation of public opinion. Second, fact-checking millions of individ-
ual articles is unfeasible. As a result, this approach is widely adopted in the
literature (see Supplementary Materials). The links to the articles considered
here were crawled from 120 low-credibility sources that, according to lists com-
piled by reputable third-party news and fact-checking organizations, routinely
publish various types of false and/or misleading news. Our own analysis of a
sample of articles confirms that the vast majority of their content is some type
of misinformation (see Methods). We also crawled the articles published by
seven independent fact-checking organizations for the purpose of comparison.
The present analysis focuses on the period from mid-May 2016 to the end of
March 2017. During this time, we collected 389,569 articles from low-credibility
sources and 15,053 articles from fact-checking sources. We further collected
from Twitter all of the public posts linking to these articles: 13,617,425 tweets
linked to low-credibility sources and 1,133,674 linked to fact checking sources.
See Methods and Supplementary Materials for details.
On average a low-credibility source published approximately 100 articles per
week. By the end of the study period, the mean popularity of those articles
was approximately 30 tweets per article per week (see Supplementary Materi-
als). However, as shown in Fig. 1, success is extremely heterogeneous across
articles. Whether we measure success by number of accounts sharing an article,
or by number of posts containing a link, we find a very broad distribution of
popularity spanning several orders of magnitude: while the majority of articles
goes unnoticed, a significant fraction goes “viral.” Unfortunately, and consistent
with prior analysis of Facebook data [41], we observe that the popularity distri-
bution of low-credibility articles is indistinguishable from that of fact-checking
articles. This result is not as bleak as that of a similar analysis based on only
fact-checked claims, which found false news to be even more viral than real
news [57]. However, the qualitative conclusion is the same: massive numbers of
people are exposed to low-credibility content.
Even though low-credibility and fact-checking sources show similar popu-
larity distributions, we observe some anomalous patterns in the spread of low-
credibility content. First, most articles by low-credibility sources spread through
original tweets and retweets, while few are shared in replies (Fig. 2(a)); this is
different from articles by fact-checking sources, which are shared mainly via
retweets but also replies (Fig. 2(b)). In other words, the spreading patterns of
low-credibility content are less “conversational.” Second, the more a story was
tweeted, the more the tweets were concentrated in the hands of few accounts,
who act as “super-spreaders” (Fig. 2(c)). This goes against the intuition that,
as a story goes “viral,” and thus reaches a broader audience, the contribution of
any individual account or group of accounts should matter less. In fact, a single
account can post the same low-credibility article hundreds or even thousands
of times (see Supplementary Materials). This could suggest that the spread is
amplified through automated means.
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Figure 1: Online virality of content. (a) Probability distribution (density func-
tion) of the number of tweets for articles from both low-credibility and fact-
checking sources. The distributions of the number of accounts sharing an article
are very similar (see Supplementary Materials). As illustrations, the diffusion
networks of two stories are shown: (b) a medium-virality misleading article ti-
tled FBI just released the Anthony Weiner warrant, and it proves they stole
election, published a month after the 2016 U.S. election and shared in over 400
tweets; and (c) a highly viral fabricated news report titled “Spirit cooking”:
Clinton campaign chairman practices bizarre occult ritual, published four days
before the 2016 U.S. election and shared in over 30 thousand tweets. In both
cases, only the largest connected component of the network is shown. Nodes
and links represent Twitter accounts and retweets of the article, respectively.
Node size indicates account influence, measured by the number of times an
account was retweeted. Node color represents bot score, from blue (likely hu-
man) to red (likely bot); yellow nodes cannot be evaluated because they have
either been suspended or deleted all their tweets. An interactive version of the
larger network is available online (iunetsci.github.io/HoaxyBots/). Note
that Twitter does not provide data to reconstruct a retweet tree; all retweets
point to the original tweet. The retweet networks shown here combine multiple
cascades (each a “star network” originating from a different tweet) that all share
the same article link.
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Figure 2: Anomalies. The distribution of types of tweet spreading articles from
(a) low-credibility and (b) fact-checking sources are quite different. Each article
is mapped along three axes representing the percentages of different types of
messages that share it: original tweets, retweets, and replies. When user Alice
retweets a tweet by user Bob, the tweet is rebroadcast to all of Alice’s followers,
whereas when she replies to Bob’s tweet, the reply is only seen by Bob. Color
represents the number of articles in each bin, on a log-scale. (c) Correlation
between popularity of articles from low-credibility sources and concentration
of posting activity. We consider a collection of articles shared by a minimum
number of tweets as a popularity group. For articles in each popularity group, a
violin plot shows the distribution of Gini coefficients, which measure concentra-
tion of posts by few accounts (see Supplementary Materials). In violin plots, the
width of a contour represents the probability of the corresponding value, and
the median is marked by a colored line. (d) Bot score distributions for a random
sample of 915 accounts who posted at least one link to a low-credibility source,
and for the 961 “super-spreaders” that most actively shared content from low-
credibility sources. The two groups have significantly different scores (p < 10−4
according to a Mann-Whitney U test): super-spreaders are more likely bots.
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We hypothesize that the “super-spreaders” of low-credibility content are
social bots, which are automatically posting links to articles, retweeting other
accounts, or performing more sophisticated autonomous tasks, like following
and replying to other users. To test this hypothesis, we used Botometer to
evaluate the Twitter accounts that posted links to articles from low-credibility
sources. For each account we computed a bot score (a number in the unit
interval), which can be interpreted as the level of automation of that account.
We used a threshold of 0.5 to classify an account as bot or human. Details
about the Botometer system and the threshold can be found in Methods. We
first considered a random sample of the general population of accounts that
shared at least one link to a low-credibility article. Only 6% of accounts in
the sample are labeled as bots using this method, but they are responsible
for spreading 31% of all tweets linking to low-credibility content, and 34% of
all articles from low-credibility sources. We then compared this group with
a sample of the top most active accounts (“super-spreaders”), 33% of which
have been labeled as bot — over five times as many (details in Supplementary
Materials). Fig. 2(d) confirms that the super-spreaders are significantly more
likely to be bots compared to the general population of accounts who share low-
credibility content. Because these results are based on a classification model,
it could be possible that what we see in Fig. 2(d) is due to bias in the way
Botometer has been trained. For example, the model could learn to assign
higher scores to more active accounts. We rule out this competing explanation
by showing that higher bot scores cannot be attributed to this kind of bias in
the learning model (see Supplementary Materials).
Given these anomalies, we submit that bots may play a critical role in driving
the viral spread of content from low-credibility sources. To test this question,
we examined whether bots tend to get involved at particular times in the spread
of popular articles. As shown in Fig. 3(a), bots are prevalent in the first few
seconds after an article is first published on Twitter. We conjecture that this
early intervention exposes many users to low-credibility articles, increasing the
chances than an article goes “viral.”
We find that another strategy often used by bots is to mention influen-
tial users in tweets that link to low-credibility content. Bots seem to employ
this targeting strategy repetitively; for example, a single account mentioned
@realDonaldTrump in 19 tweets, each linking to the same false claim about mil-
lions of votes by illegal immigrants (see details in Supplementary Materials).
For a systematic investigation, let us consider all tweets that mention or reply
to a user and include a link to a viral article from a low-credibility source in our
corpus. The number of followers is often used as a proxy for the influence of a
Twitter user. As shown in Fig. 3(b), in general tweets tend to mention popular
people. However, accounts with the largest bot scores tend to mention users
with a larger number of followers (median and average). A possible explana-
tion for this strategy is that bots (or rather, their operators) target influential
users with content from low-credibility sources, creating the appearance that it
is widely shared. The hope is that these targets will then reshare the content
to their followers, thus boosting its credibility.
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Figure 3: Bot strategies. (a) Early bot support after a viral low-credibility
article is first shared. We consider a sample of 60,000 accounts that participate
in the spread of the 1,000 most viral stories from low-credibility sources. We
align the times when each article first appears. We focus on a one-hour early
spreading phase following each of these events, and divide it into logarithmic
lag intervals. The plot shows the bot score distribution for accounts sharing the
articles during each of these lag intervals. (b) Targeting of influentials. We plot
the average number of followers of Twitter users who are mentioned (or replied
to) by accounts that link to the most viral 1000 stories. The mentioning accounts
are aggregated into three groups by bot score percentile. Error bars indicate
standard errors. Inset: Distributions of follower counts for users mentioned by
accounts in each percentile group.
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We examined whether bot operators tended to target people in certain states
by creating the appearance of users posting articles from those locations. We
did find that the location patterns produced by bots are inconsistent with the
geographic distribution of conversations on Twitter. However, we did not find
evidence that bots sharing articles from low-credibility sources used this par-
ticular strategy to target swing states. Details of this analysis can be found in
Supplementary Materials.
Having found that bots are employed in ways that appear to drive the viral
spread of low-credibility articles, let us explore how humans interact with the
content shared by bots, which may provide insight into whether and how bots
are able to affect public opinion. Fig. 4(a) shows who retweets whom: humans
do most of the retweeting (Fig. 4(b)), and they retweet articles posted by bots
as much as by other humans (Fig. 4(c)). This suggests that collectively, people
are not able to discriminate between low-credibility content shared by humans
versus social bots. It also means that when we observe many accounts exposed
to low-credibility information, these are not just bots (re)tweeting it. In fact, we
find that the volume of tweets by likely humans scales super-linearly with the
volume by likely bots, suggesting that the reach of these articles among humans
is amplified by social bots. In other words, each amount of sharing activity by
bots tends to trigger a disproportionate amount of human engagement. The
same amplification effect is not observed for articles from fact-checking sources.
Details are presented in Supplementary Materials.
Another way to assess the impact of bots in the spread of low-credibility
content is to examine their critical role within the diffusion network. Let us
focus on the retweet network [47], where nodes are accounts and connections
represents retweets of messages with links to stories — just like the networks
in Fig. 1(b,c), but aggregating across all articles from low-credibility sources.
We apply a network dismantling procedure [1]: we disconnect one node at a
time and analyze the resulting decrease in the total volume of retweets and in
the total number of unique articles. The more these quantities are reduced by
disconnecting a small number of nodes, the more critical those nodes are in
the network. We prioritize accounts to disconnect based on bot score and, for
comparison, also based on retweeting activity and influence. Further details can
be found in Methods. Unsurprisingly, Fig. 4(d,e) shows that influential nodes are
most critical. The most influential nodes are unlikely to be bots. Disconnecting
nodes with high bot score is the second-best strategy for reducing low-credibility
articles (Fig. 4(d)). For reducing overall post volume, this strategy performs well
when more than 10% of nodes are disconnected (Fig. 4(e)). Disconnecting active
nodes is not as efficient a strategy for reducing low-credibility articles. These
results show that bots are critical in the diffusion network: disconnecting likely
bots results in the removal of most low-credibility content.
Finally, we compared the extent to which social bots disseminate content
from different low-credibility sources. We considered the most popular sources
in terms of median and aggregate article posts, and measured the bot scores of
the accounts that most actively spread their content. As shown in Fig. 5, one site
(beforeitsnews.com) stands out for the high degree of automation, but other
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Figure 4: Impact of bots. (a) Joint distribution of bot scores of accounts that
retweeted links to low-credibility articles and accounts that had originally posted
the links. Color represents the number of retweeted messages in each bin, on
a log scale. (b) The top projection shows the distributions of bot scores for
retweeters, who are mostly human. (c) The left projection shows the distribu-
tions of bot scores for accounts retweeted by likely humans (score below 0.5),
with a significant portion of likely bots. (d,e) Dismantling the low-credibility
content diffusion network. The priority of disconnected nodes is determined by
ranking accounts on the basis of different characteristics. The remaining frac-
tion of (d) unique articles from low-credibility sources and (e) retweets linking
to those articles is plotted versus the number of disconnected nodes.
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Figure 5: Popularity and bot support for the top sources. Satire websites are
shown in orange, fact-checking sites in blue, and low-credibility sources in red.
Popularity is measured by total tweet volume (horizontal axis) and median
number of tweets per article (circle area). Bot support is gauged by the median
bot score of the 100 most active accounts posting links to articles from each
source (vertical axis). Low-credibility sources have greater support by bots, as
well as greater median and/or total volume in many cases.
popular low-credibility sources also have many bots among their promoters.
The dissemination of content from satire sites like The Onion and fact-checking
websites does not display the same level of automation.
3 Discussion
Our analysis provides quantitative empirical evidence of the key role played by
social bots in the spread of low-credibility content. Relatively few accounts are
responsible for a large share of the traffic that carries misinformation. These
accounts are likely bots, and we uncovered two manipulation strategies they
use. First, bots are particularly active in amplifying content in the very early
spreading moments, before an article goes “viral.” Second, bots target influen-
tial users through replies and mentions. People are vulnerable to these kinds of
manipulation, retweeting bots who post low-credibility content just as much as
they retweet other humans. As a result, bots amplify the reach of low-credibility
content, to the point that it is statistically indistinguishable from that of fact-
checking articles. Successful low-credibility sources in the U.S., including those
on both ends of the political spectrum, are heavily supported by social bots.
Social media platforms are beginning to acknowledge these problems and deploy
countermeasures, although their effectiveness is hard to evaluate [60, 35, 27].
The present findings are not in contradiction with the recent work by Vosoughi
et al. [57]. Their analysis is based on a small subset of articles that are fact-
checked, whereas the present work considers a much broader set of articles from
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low-credibility sources, most of which are not fact-checked. In addition, the
analysis of Vosoughi et al. did not consider an important mechanism by which
bots can amplify the spread of an article, namely, by resharing links originally
posted by human accounts. Because of these two methodological differences,
the present analysis provides new evidence about the role played by bots.
Our results are robust with respect to various choices. First, using a more
restrictive criterion for selecting low-credibility sources, based on a consensus
among several news and fact-checking organizations (see Methods), yields qual-
itatively similar results, leading to the same conclusions. Second, our analysis
about active spreaders of low-credibility content being likely bots is robust with
respect to the activity threshold used to identify the most active spreaders.
Furthermore, activity and bot scores are uncorrelated with account activity vol-
ume. Third, the conclusions are not affected by the use of different bot-score
thresholds to separate social bots and human accounts. Details about all of
these robustness analyses can be found in Supplementary Materials.
Our findings demonstrate that social bots are an effective tool to manipulate
social media. While the present study focuses on the spread of low-credibility
content, such as false news, conspiracy theories, and junk science, similar bot
strategies may be used to spread other types of malicious content, such as mal-
ware. And although our spreading data is collected from Twitter, there is no
reason to believe that the same kind of abuse is not taking place on other digi-
tal platforms as well. In fact, viral conspiracy theories spread on Facebook [12]
among the followers of pages that, like social bots, can easily be managed au-
tomatically and anonymously. Furthermore, just like on Twitter, false claims
on Facebook are as likely to go viral as reliable news [41]. While the difficulty
to access spreading data on platforms like Facebook is a concern, the growing
popularity of ephemeral social media like Snapchat may make future studies of
this type of abuse all but impossible.
The results presented here suggest that curbing social bots may be an effec-
tive strategy for mitigating the spread of low-credibility content, and that the
bot score might provide a useful signal to prioritize accounts for further review.
Progress in this direction may be accelerated through partnerships between so-
cial media platforms and academic research [27]. For example, our lab and oth-
ers are developing machine learning algorithms to detect social bots [14, 51, 54].
The deployment of such tools is fraught with peril, however. While platforms
have the right to enforce their terms of service, which forbid impersonation and
deception, algorithms do make mistakes. Even a single false-positive error lead-
ing to the suspension of a legitimate account may foster valid concerns about
censorship. This justifies current human-in-the-loop solutions, which unfortu-
nately do not scale with the volume of abuse that is enabled by software. It
is therefore imperative to support research both on improved abuse detection
algorithms and on countermeasures that take into account the complex inter-
play between the cognitive and technological factors that favor the spread of
misinformation [30].
An alternative strategy would be to employ CAPTCHAs [56], challenge-
response tests to determine whether a user is human. CAPTCHAs have been
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deployed widely and successfully to combat email spam and other types of online
abuse. Their use to limit automatic posting or resharing of news links could
help stem bot abuse by increasing its cost, but also add undesirable friction to
benign applications of automation by legitimate entities, such as news media
and emergency response coordinators. These are hard trade-offs that must be
studied carefully as we contemplate ways to address the fake news epidemics.
4 Methods
Data about articles shared on Twitter was collected through Hoaxy, an open
platform developed at Indiana University to track the spread of claims and fact
checking [47]. A search engine, interactive visualizations, and open-source soft-
ware are freely available (hoaxy.iuni.iu.edu). The data is accessible through
a public API. Further details are presented in Supplementary Materials.
We started the collection in mid-May 2016 with 70 low-credibility sites and
added 50 more in mid-December 2016. The collection period for the present
analysis extends until the end of March 2017. During this time, we collected
389,569 articles from these 120 sites. We also tracked 15,053 stories published by
independent fact-checking organizations, such as snopes.com, politifact.com,
and factcheck.org. We did not exclude satire because many low-credibility
sources label their content as satirical, and satire that goes “viral” is sometimes
mistaken for real news. The Onion is the satirical source with the highest total
volume of shares. We repeated our analyses of most viral articles (e.g., Fig. 3(a))
with articles from theonion.com excluded and the results were not affected.
The full list of 120 sources is reported in Supplementary Materials. We
also repeated the analysis using a more restrictive criterion for selecting low-
credibility sources, based on a consensus among three or more news and fact-
checking organizations. This yields 327,840 articles (86% of the total) from
65 low-credibility sources, also listed in Supplementary Materials, where we
show that the results are robust with respect to these different source selection
criteria.
Our analysis does not require a complete list of low-credibility sources, but
does rely on the assumption that many articles published by these sources can
be classified as some kind of misinformation or unsubstantiated information. To
validate this assumption, we checked the content of a random sample of articles.
For the purpose of this verification, we adopted a definition of “misinformation”
that follows industry convention and includes the following classes: fabricated
content, manipulated content, imposter content, false context, misleading con-
tent, false connection, and satire [58]. To these seven categories we also added
articles whose claims could not be verified. We found that fewer that 15% of
articles could be verified. More details are available in Supplementary Materials.
Using the filtering endpoint of Twitter’s public streaming API, we col-
lected 13,617,425 public posts that included links to articles from low-credibility
sources and 1,133,674 public posts linking to fact checks. This is the complete
set of tweets linking to these articles in the study period, and not a sample (see
12
Supplementary Materials for details). We extracted metadata about the source
of each link, the account that shared it, the original poster in case of retweet or
quoted tweet, and any users mentioned or replied to in the tweet.
We transformed links to canonical URLs to merge different links referring to
the same article. This happens mainly due to shortening services (44% links are
redirected) and extra parameters (34% of URLs contain analytics tracking pa-
rameters), but we also found websites that use duplicate domains and snapshot
services. Canonical URLs were obtained by resolving redirection and removing
analytics parameters.
The bot score of Twitter accounts is computed using the Botometer classifier,
which evaluates the extent to which an account exhibits similarity to the charac-
teristics of social bots [54]. The system is based on a supervised machine learning
algorithm leveraging more than a thousand features extracted from public data
and meta-data about Twitter accounts. These features include various descrip-
tors of information diffusion networks, user metadata, friend statistics, tempo-
ral patterns of activity, part-of-speech and sentiment analysis. The classifier is
trained using publicly available datasets of tens of thousands of Twitter users
that include both humans and bots of varying sophistication. The Botometer
system is available through a public API (botometer.iuni.iu.edu). It has also
been employed in other studies [57, 61] and is widely adopted, serving hundreds
of thousand requests daily.
For the present analysis, we use the Twitter Search API to collect up to
200 of an account’s most recent tweets and up to 100 of the most recent tweets
mentioning the account. From this data we extract the features used by the
Botometer classifier. We use logistic calibration to make the bot scores calcu-
lated by the classifier easier to interpret as confidence levels (see Supplementary
Materials).
There is no crisp, binary classification of accounts as human or bot, as there
are many types of bots and humans using different levels of automation. Ac-
cordingly, Botometer provides a score (percentage) rather than a binary classifi-
cation. Nevertheless, the model can effectively discriminate between human and
bot accounts of different nature; five-fold cross-validation yields an area under
the ROC curve of 94% [54]. A value of 50% indicates random accuracy and
100% means perfect accuracy. When a binary classification is needed, we use a
threshold of 0.5, which maximizes accuracy [54]. See Supplementary Materials
for further details about bot classification and its robustness.
In the targeting analysis (Fig. 3(b)), we exclude mentions of sources using
the pattern “via @screen name.”
The network studied in the dismantling analysis (Fig. 4(d,e)) is based on
retweets with links to articles from low-credibility sources, posted before the
election (May 16–Nov 7, 2016). The network has 630,368 nodes (accounts) and
2,236,041 directed edges. Each edge is weighted by the number of retweets be-
tween the same pair of accounts. When an account is disconnected, all of its in-
coming and outgoing edges are removed. When we disconnect a retweeting node
i that was in turn retweeted by some node j, only i is removed because in the
Twitter metadata, each retweet connects directly to the account that originated
13
the tweet. Given the directionality of edges, retweeting activity is measured by
node in-strength (weighted in-degree) and influence by out-strength (weighted
out-degree).
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Appendix: Supplementary Background
Tracking abuse of social media has been a topic of intense research in recent
years. The analysis in the main text leverages Hoaxy, a system focused on
tracking the spread of links to articles from low-credibility and fact-checking
sources [46]. Here we give a brief overview of other systems designed to monitor
the spread of misinformation on social media. This is related to the problems
of mining and detecting misinformation and fake news, which are the subjects
of recent surveys [64, 48].
Beginning with the detection of simple instances of political abuse like as-
troturfing [43], researchers noted the need for automated tools for monitoring
social media streams and detecting manipulation or misinformation. Several
such systems have been proposed in recent years, each with a particular focus
or a different approach. The Truthy system [43] relied on network analysis
techniques to classify memes, such as hashtags and links. TraceMiner [63] also
models the propagation of messages, but by inferring embeddings of social me-
dia users with social network structures. The TweetCred system [6, 18] focuses
on content-based features and other kind of metadata, and distills a measure
of overall information credibility. The Hierarchical Credibility Network [24]
considers credibility as propagating through a three-layer network consisting of
event, sub-events, and messages classified based on their features.
Specific systems have been proposed to detect rumors [66]. These include Ru-
morLens [44], TwitterTrails [34], FactWatcher [19], and News Tracer [32]. The
news verification capabilities of these systems range from completely automatic
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(TweetCred), to semi-automatic (TwitterTrails, RumorLens, News Tracer). In
addition, some of them let the user explore the propagation of a rumor with an
interactive dashboard (TwitterTrails, RumorLens). These systems vary in their
capability to monitor the social media stream automatically, but in all cases the
user is required to enter a seed rumor or keyword to operate them.
Our analysis is based on the spread of content from low-credibility sources
rather than focusing on individual stories that are labeled as misinformation.
Due to the impossibility to fact-check millions of articles, this approach of us-
ing sources as proxies for misinformation labels is increasingly adopted in the
literature cited in the main text, and more [53, 49, 65, 3, 17].
Since misinformation can be propagated by coordinated online campaigns,
it is important to detect whether a meme is being artificially promoted. Ma-
chine learning has been applied successfully to the task of early discriminating
between trending memes that are either organic or promoted by means of ad-
vertisement [55].
Finally, there is a growing body of research on social bot detection. The level
of sophistication of bot-based manipulation can vary greatly [5]. As discussed
in the main text, there is a large gray area between human and completely
automated accounts. So-called cyborgs are accounts used to amplify content
generated by humans [7]. It is possible that a significant portion of the manip-
ulation discussed in this paper, aimed to amplify the spread of low-credibility
content, is carried out by this kind of bot. The Botometer system used in this
paper has been publicly available for a few years [10]. Its earliest version was
trained on simple spam bots, detected through a social honeypot system [59, 28].
The version used here was trained on public datasets that also included more
sophisticated bots.
Appendix: Supplementary Methods
List of Sources
Our list of low-credibility sources was obtained by merging several lists compiled
by third-party news and fact-checking organizations or experts. It should be
noted that these lists were compiled independently of each other, and as a
result they have uneven coverage. However, there is overlap between them.
The full list of sources is shown in Table 1. Some lists annotate sources in
different categories. In the case of OpenSources (www.opensources.co), we
only considered sources tagged with any of the following labels: fake, satire,
bias, conspiracy, rumor, state, junksci, clickbait, hate. In the case of Starbird’s
list of alternative domains [49], we considered those with primary orientation
coded as one of conspiracy theorists, political agenda, tabloid—clickbait news.
For robustness analysis (below), we also consider a “consensus” subset of
sites that are each listed among low-credibility sources by at least three orga-
nizations or experts. This subset includes 65 sources, also shown in Table 1.
We track 10,663,818 tweets (79% of the total) with links to 327,840 articles
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(86% of the total) from consensus low-credibility source, generated by 1,135,167
accounts (84% of the total).
We additionally tracked the websites of seven independent fact-checking or-
ganizations: badsatiretoday.com, factcheck.org, hoax-slayer.com,1 opensecrets.
org, politifact.com, snopes.com, and truthorfiction.com. In April 2017
we added climatefeedback.org, which does not affect the present analysis.
Table 1: Low-credibility sources. For each source, we indicate which lists include
it. The lists are: Fake News Watch (FNW), OpenSources (OS), Daily Dot (DD),
US News & World Report (US), New Republic (NR), CBS, Urban Legends (UL),
NPR, Snopes Field Guide (Sn), Starbird Alternative Domains (KS), BuzzFeed
News (BF), and PolitiFact (PF). Table headers link to the original lists. The
date indicates when Hoaxy started following a source: June 29 or December 20,
2016. Consensus sources (in three or more lists) are shown in italics.
Source FNW OS DD US NR CBS UL NPR Sn KS BF PF Date
21stcenturywire.com X X X X Jun
70news.wordpress.com X X X Dec
abcnews.com.co X X X X X Dec
activistpost.com X X X X X Jun
addictinginfo.org X X X Dec
americannews.com X X X X X Jun
americannewsx.com X Dec
amplifyingglass.com X Jun
anonews.co X Dec
beforeitsnews.com X X X X X Jun
bigamericannews.com X X Jun
bipartisanreport.com X X Dec
bluenationreview.com X X Dec
breitbart.com X X X Dec
burrardstreetjournal.com X X X Dec
callthecops.net X X X Dec
christiantimes.com X Dec
christwire.org X X X Jun
chronicle.su X X Jun
civictribune.com X X X X X X Jun
clickhole.com X X X X Jun
coasttocoastam.com X X Jun
collective-evolution.com X Dec
consciouslifenews.com X X X X Jun
conservativeoutfitters.com X X X Dec
countdowntozerotime.com X X X Jun
counterpsyops.com X X Jun
creambmp.com X X X Jun
dailybuzzlive.com X X X X Jun
dailycurrant.com X X X X Jun
dailynewsbin.com X Dec
dcclothesline.com X X X Jun
demyx.com X Dec
denverguardian.com X X X Dec
derfmagazine.com X X Jun
disclose.tv X X X X Jun
Continued on next page
1hoax-slayer.com includes its older version hoax-slayer.net.
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Table 1 – continued from previous page
Source FNW OS DD US NR CBS UL NPR Sn KS BF PF Date
duffelblog.com X X X X Jun
duhprogressive.com X X Jun
empireherald.com X X X X Dec
empirenews.net X X X X X X X X Jun
empiresports.co X X X X X X X Jun
en.mediamass.net X X X X Jun
endingthefed.com X Dec
enduringvision.com X X X Jun
flyheight.com X Dec
fprnradio.com X X Jun
freewoodpost.com X X X X Dec
geoengineeringwatch.org X X Jun
globalassociatednews.com X X X Dec
globalresearch.ca X X X Jun
gomerblog.com X Jun
govtslaves.info X X X Jun
gulagbound.com X X Jun
hangthebankers.com X X Jun
humansarefree.com X X Jun
huzlers.com X X X X X X X X Jun
ifyouonlynews.com X X Dec
infowars.com X X X X X X Jun
intellihub.com X X X Jun
itaglive.com X Jun
jonesreport.com X X Jun
lewrockwell.com X X X Jun
liberalamerica.org X Dec
libertymovementradio.com X X Jun
libertytalk.fm X X Jun
libertyvideos.org X X Jun
lightlybraisedturnip.com X Dec
nationalreport.net X X X X X X X X X X Jun
naturalnews.com X X X X Jun
ncscooper.com X X X Dec
newsbiscuit.com X X X X Jun
newslo.coma X X X X X X Jun
newsmutiny.com X X X Jun
newswire-24.com X X Jun
nodisinfo.com X X X Jun
now8news.com X X X X X Dec
nowtheendbegins.com X X Jun
occupydemocrats.com X X X Dec
other98.com X X Dec
pakalertpress.com X X Jun
politicalblindspot.com X X Jun
politicalears.com X X Jun
politicops.coma X X X X X Jun
politicususa.com X Dec
prisonplanet.com X X Jun
react365.com X X X X X Dec
realfarmacy.com X X Jun
realnewsrightnow.com X X X X X X Jun
redflagnews.com X X X X Jun
redstate.com X X Dec
rilenews.com X X X X X X Jun
Continued on next page
17
Table 1 – continued from previous page
Source FNW OS DD US NR CBS UL NPR Sn KS BF PF Date
rockcitytimes.com X Jun
satiratribune.com X X X X Dec
stuppid.com X X X Dec
theblaze.com X Dec
thebostontribune.com X X X Dec
thedailysheeple.com X X X Jun
thedcgazette.comb X X X X Jun
thefreethoughtproject.com X X X Dec
thelapine.ca X X Jun
thenewsnerd.com X X X X Jun
theonion.com X X X X X X X Jun
theracketreport.com X X X X Dec
therundownlive.com X X Jun
thespoof.com X X X Jun
theuspatriot.com X X Jun
truthfrequencyradio.com X X Jun
twitchy.com X Dec
unconfirmedsources.com X X Jun
USAToday.com.co X X Dec
usuncut.com X X Dec
veteranstoday.com X X X Jun
wakingupwisconsin.com X X Jun
weeklyworldnews.com X X X X Jun
wideawakeamerica.com X Jun
winningdemocrats.com X Dec
witscience.org X X X Jun
wnd.com X Dec
worldnewsdailyreport.com X X X X X X X Jun
worldtruth.tv X X X X X Jun
yournewswire.com X X X X X Dec
a newslo.com and politicops.com are mirrors of politicot.com.
b thedcgazette.com is a mirror of dcgazette.com.
Hoaxy Data
The back-end component of Hoaxy collects public tweets that link to a prede-
fined list of websites. The use of the “POST statuses/filter” endpoint of the
Twitter streaming API, together with the total volume of tweets collected, which
is well below 1% of all public tweets, guarantee that we obtain all tweets linking
to the sites in our list, and not just a sample of the tweets with these links. In
addition, Hoaxy crawls all tracked websites and indexes all their articles, sup-
porting a full-text search engine that allows users to find articles matching a
given query. Furthermore, users can select subsets of these articles to visualize
their spread on Twitter. To this end, Hoaxy matches the indexed articles with
the tweets in our database and constructs networks based on retweets, mentions,
replies, and quoted tweets. The front-end visualizes these networks interactively,
allowing users to explore the accounts (nodes) and the tweets (edges) that make
up these networks. The system makes all the data accessible to the public
through a website (hoaxy.iuni.iu.edu) and an API.
Our analysis focuses on the period from mid-May 2016 to the end of March
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Figure 6: Weekly tweeted low-credibility articles, tweets/article ratio and ar-
ticles/site ratio. The collection was briefly interrupted in October 2016. In
December 2016 we expanded the set of low-credibility sources, from 70 to 120
websites.
2017. During this time, we collected 15,053 and 389,569 articles from fact-
checking and low-credibility sources, respectively. The Hoaxy system collected
1,133,674 public posts that included links to fact checks and 13,617,425 pub-
lic posts linking to low-credibility articles. As shown in Fig. 6, low-credibility
websites each produced approximately 100 articles per week, on average. To-
ward the end of the study period, this content was shared by approximately 30
tweets per article per week, on average. However, as discussed in the main text,
success is extremely heterogeneous across articles. This is the case irrespec-
tive of whether we measure success through the number of tweets (Fig. 7(a))
or accounts (Fig. 7(b)) sharing an article. For both popularity measures, the
distributions are very broad and basically indistinguishable across articles from
low-credibility vs. fact-checking sources.
Content Analysis
Our analysis considers content published by a set of websites flagged as sources
of misinformation by third-party journalistic and fact-checking organizations
(Table 1). This source-based approach relies on the assumption that most of the
articles published by our compilation of sources are some type of misinformation,
as we cannot fact-check each individual article. We validated this assumption
by estimating the rate of false positives, i.e, verified articles, in the corpus.
We manually evaluated a random sample of articles (N = 50) drawn from our
corpus, stratified by source. We considered only those sources whose articles
were tweeted at least once in the period of interest. To draw an article, we
first selected a source at random with replacement, and then chose one of the
19
100 101 102 103 104
(a) Number of Tweets
10 9
10 7
10 5
10 3
10 1
PD
F
Low-credibility
Fact checking
100 101 102 103 104
(b) Number of Users
10 8
10 6
10 4
10 2
100
PD
F
Low-credibility
Fact Checking
Figure 7: Probability distributions of popularity of articles from low-credibility
and fact-checking sources, measured by (a) the number of tweets and (b) the
number of accounts sharing links to an article.
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articles it published, again at random but without replacement. We repeated
our analysis on an additional sample (N = 50) in which the chances of drawing
an article are proportional to the number of times it was tweeted. This ‘sample
by tweet’ is thus biased toward more popular sources.
It is important to note that articles with unverified claims are sometimes
updated after being debunked. This happens usually late, after the article has
spread, and could lead to overestimating the rate of false positives. To mitigate
this phenomenon, the earliest snapshot of each article was retrieved from the
Wayback Machine at the Internet Archive (archive.org). If no snapshot was
available, we retrieved the version of the page current at verification time. If the
page was missing from the website or the website was down, we reviewed the
title and body of the article crawled by Hoaxy. We gave priority to the current
version over the possibly more accurate crawled version because, in deciding
whether a piece of content is misinformation, we want to consider any form of
visual evidence included with it, such as images or videos.
After retrieving all articles in the two samples, each article was evaluated
independently by two reviewers (two of the authors), using a rubric summarized
in Fig. 8. Each article was then labeled with the majority label, with ties broken
by a third reviewer (another author). Fig 9 shows the results of the analysis. We
report the fractions of articles that were verified and that could not be verified
(inconclusive), out of the total number of articles that contain any factual claim.
The rate of false positives is below 15% in both samples.
Concentration
In the main text we use the Gini coefficient to calculate the concentration of
posting activity for an article, based on the accounts that post links to the
article. For each article, the Lorenz curve plots the cumulative share of tweets
versus the cumulative share of accounts generating these tweets. The Gini
coefficient is the ratio of the area that lies between the line of equality (diagonal)
and the Lorenz curve, over the total area under the line of equality. A high
coefficient indicates that a small subset of accounts was responsible for a large
portion of the posts.
Bot Score Calibration
Calibration methods are applicable when a machine learning classifier outputs
probabilistic scores. Well-calibrated classifiers are probabilistic models for which
the estimates can be directly interpreted as confidence levels. We use Platt’s
scaling [38], a logistic regression model trained on classifier outputs, to calibrate
the bot score computed by the Botometer classifier.
We present the mapping between raw and calibrated scores in Fig. 10. The
calibration only changes scores within the unit interval, but retains the ranking
among accounts. The figure also shows reliability diagrams for raw and cali-
brated scores [11]. We split the unit interval into 20 bins. Each instance in
the training data set is assigned to a bin based on its predicted (raw) score.
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Figure 8: Flowchart summarizing the annotation rubric employed in the content
analysis.
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Figure 9: Content analysis based on two samples of articles. Sampling by
source gives each source equal representation, while sampling by tweets biases
the analysis toward more popular sources. We excluded from the sample by
source three articles that did not contain any factual claims. Satire articles are
grouped with misinformation, as explained in the main text.
Figure 10: Bot score calibration curves. Left: The calibration mapping function
projects raw classifier output to calibrated scores. Right: Reliability curves plot
the true positive rate against the mean predicted scores. The calibrated curve
indicates higher reliability because it is closer to the unbiased diagonal line.
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Table 2: Analysis of likely bots and their content spreading activity based on
a random sample of Twitter accounts sharing at least one article from a low-
credibility source.
Total Likely bots Percentage
Accounts 915 54 6%
Tweets with low-credibility articles 11,656 3,587 31%
Unique low-credibility articles 7,726 2,608 34%
Tweets with fact-checks 598 4 0.7%
Unique fact-checks 395 3 0.8%
For each bin, the mean predicted score is computed and compared against the
fraction of true positive cases. In a well-calibrated model, the points align to
the diagonal.
Bot Classification
To show that a few social bots are disproportionately responsible for the spread
of low-credibility content, we considered a random sample of accounts that
shared at least one article from a low-credibility source, and evaluated these
accounts using the bot classification system Botometer. Out of 1,000 sampled
accounts, 85 could not be inspected because they had been either suspended,
deleted, or turned private. For each of the remaining 915, Botometer returned
a bot score estimating the level of automation of the account. To quantify how
many accounts are likely bots, we transform bot scores into binary assessments
using a threshold of 0.5. This is a conservative choice to minimize false negatives
and especially false positives, as shown in prior work (cit. in main text). Table 2
shows the fraction of accounts with scores above the threshold. To give a sense
of their overall impact in the spreading of low-credibility content, Table 2 also
shows the fraction of tweets with articles from low-credibility sources posted
by accounts that are likely bots, and the number of unique articles included
in those tweets overall. As a comparison, we also tally the fact-checks shared
by these accounts, showing that bot accounts focused on sharing low-credibility
content and ignored fact-checking content.
In the main text we show the distributions of bot scores for this sample of ac-
counts, as well as for a sample of accounts that have been most active in spread-
ing low-credibility content (super-spreaders). To select the super-spreaders, we
ranked all accounts by how many tweets they posted with links to low-credibility
sources, and considered the top 1,000 accounts. We then performed the same
classification steps discussed above. For the same reasons mentioned above, we
could not obtain scores for 39 of these accounts, leaving us with a sample of 961
scored accounts.
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Figure 11: Cumulative distribution of repetitions, i.e., the number of times a
single account tweets the same link to an article from a low-credibility source.
Appendix: Supplementary Text
Super-Spreaders of Low-Credibility Content
In the main text we show that the more popular a low-credibility article, the
more its posting activity is concentrated around a relative small number of
active accounts. We also find that the most active spreaders of content from
low-credibility sources are more likely to be social bots. To further illustrate
the anomalous activity patterns of these “super-spreaders,” Fig. 11 plots the
distribution of repeated tweets by individual accounts sharing the same low-
credibility article. While it is normal behavior for a person to share an article
once, the long tail of the distribution highlights inorganic, automated support.
A single account posting the same article over and over — hundreds or thousands
of times in some cases — is likely controlled by software.
Bots Targeting Influentials
The main text discusses a strategy used by bots, by which influential users are
mentioned in tweets that link to low-credibility content. Bots seem to employ
this targeting strategy repetitively. Fig. 12 offers an illustration: in this example,
a (now suspended) single account produced 19 tweets linking to the article shown
in the figure and mentioning @realDonaldTrump.
Amplification by Bots
The analysis in the main text focuses on the role of bots in the spread of articles
from low-credibility sources, assuming that bots do not equally support the
spread of articles from fact-checking sources. In fact, we show in the main
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Figure 12: Example of targeting for the article Report: three million votes
in presidential election cast by illegal aliens, published by Infowars.com on
November 14, 2016 and shared over 18 thousand times on Twitter. Only a
portion of the diffusion network is shown. Nodes stand for Twitter accounts,
with size representing number of followers. Links illustrate how the article
spreads: by retweets and quoted tweets (blue), or by replies and mentions (red).
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Figure 13: Fraction of tweets linking to news articles that are posted by accounts
with bot score above a threshold, as a function of the popularity of the linked
articles. We see different bot activity for articles from low-credibility (left)
versus fact-checking (right) sources.
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Figure 14: For links to articles from low-credibility (left) and fact-checking
(right) sources, the number of tweets by accounts with bot score above a thresh-
old is plotted versus the number of tweets by accounts with bot score below the
threshold. The dashed lines are guides to the eye, showing linear growth. A
super-linear relationship is a signature of amplification by bots.
text that articles from low-credibility and fact-checking sources spread through
different mixes of original tweets, retweets, and replies. And we also find that
low-credibility sources have greater support from bots than fact-checking and
satire sources. To further confirm the assumption that bots do not play an equal
role in the spread of fact-checking articles, we observe in Fig. 13 that the fraction
of tweets posted by likely bots is much higher for articles from low-credibility
sources. Further, the fraction depends on popularity in the case of articles from
low-credibility sources (it gets diluted for more viral ones), whereas it is flatter
for articles from fact-checking sources. Here, bots and humans are separated
based on a threshold in the bot score. These findings are robust to the choice
of threshold, and point to selective amplification of articles from low-credibility
sources by bots.
To focus on amplification more directly, let us consider how exposure to
humans varies with activity by bots. Fig. 14 estimates the numbers of tweets
by likely humans/bots, using a threshold on bot scores to separate them. Re-
sults are robust with respect to the choice of threshold. For articles from low-
credibility sources, the estimated number of human tweets per article grows
faster than the estimated number of bot tweets for article. For fact-checking
articles, instead, we find a linear relationship. In other words, bots seem to
amplify the reach of articles from low-credibility sources, but not the reach of
articles from fact-checking sources.
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Figure 15: Map of location targeting by bots, relative to a baseline. To gauge
sharing activity by likely bots, we considered 793,909 tweets in the period be-
tween August and October 2016 posting links to low-credibility articles by ac-
counts with bot score above 0.5 that reported a U.S. state location in their
profile. We compared the tweet frequencies by states with those expected from
a sample of 1,393,592,062 tweets in the same period, obtained from a 10% ran-
dom sample of public posts from the Twitter streaming API. Colors indicate
log ratios after normalization: positive values indicate states with higher than
expected bot activity. Using different thresholds yields similar maps.
Geographic Targeting
We examined whether bots (or rather their programmers) tended to target vot-
ers in certain states by creating the appearance of users posting from those
locations. To this end, we considered accounts with bot scores above a thresh-
old that shared articles from low-credibility sources in the three months before
the election, and focused on those accounts with a state location in their profile.
The location is self-reported and thus trivial to fake. We compared the distri-
bution of bot account locations across states with a baseline obtained from a
large sample of tweets in the same period. A χ2 test indicates that the location
patterns produced by bots are inconsistent with the geographic distribution of
conversations on Twitter (p < 10−4). This suggests that as part of their dis-
guise, social bots are more likely to report certain locations than others. For
example, Fig. 15 shows higher than expected bot activity appearing to origi-
nate from the states of Montana, Maine, and Wisconsin. However, we did not
find evidence that bots used this particular strategy for geographic targeting of
swing states (Table 3).
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Table 3: Spearman rank correlation ρ between U.S. state absolute expected vote
margin and relative bot activity. Low margins indicate 2016 tight races (swing
states). Data from FiveThirtyEight (projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2016-
election-forecast/). Bot activity is measured by numbers of tweets posting
links to low-credibility articles by accounts with bot score above threshold that
reported a U.S. state location in their profile, in the period between August and
October 2016. The counts by states are normalized by those expected from a
sample of 1,393,592,062 tweets in the same period, obtained from a 10% random
sample of public posts from the Twitter streaming API. The positive correlation
indicates that bot activity was not associated with swing states. The p-values
are based on two-tailed t-tests.
Bot score threshold Tweets by likely bots ρ p-value
0.4 1,135,816 0.28 0.04
0.5 793,909 0.29 0.04
0.6 588,751 0.30 0.03
Robustness Analyses
The results in the main text are robust with respect to various choices and
assumptions, presented next.
Criteria for selection of sources
We repeated the analyses in the main text using the more restrictive criterion for
selecting low-credibility sources, based on a consensus among three or more news
and fact-checking organizations. The 65 consensus sources are listed in Table 1.
To carry out these analyses, we inspected 33,115 accounts and could obtain bot
scores for 32,250 of them; the rest had been suspended or gone private. The
results are qualitatively similar to those in the main text and support the ro-
bustness of the findings, namely: super-spreaders of articles from low-credibility
sources are likely bots (Fig. 16), bots amplify the spread of information from
low-credibility sources in the early phases (Fig. 17), bots target influential users
(Fig. 18), and humans retweet low-credibility content posted by bots (Fig. 19).
Absence of correlation between activity and bot score
Our notion of super-spreader is based upon ranking accounts by activity and
taking those above a threshold. The analysis about super-spreaders of low-
credibility content being likely bots assumes that this finding is not explained
by a correlation between activity and bot score. In fact, although the bot clas-
sification model does consider volume of tweets as one among over a thousand
features, it is not trained in such a way that there is an obvious monotonic rela-
tion between activity and bot score. A simple monotonic relation between over-
all volume and bot score would lead to many false positives, because many bots
produce very few tweets or appear to produce none (they delete their tweets);
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Figure 16: Bot score distributions for super-spreaders vs. randomly selected
sharers of links to low-credibility sources selected by the consensus criterion.
The random sample includes 992 accounts who posted at least one link to an
article from a low-credibility source. Their bot scores are compared to 997
accounts that most actively share such links. The two groups have significantly
different scores (p < 10−4 according to a Mann-Whitney U test).
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Figure 17: Temporal evolution of bot support after the first share of a viral
story from a consensus low-credibility source. We consider a random sample of
20,000 accounts out of the 163,563 accounts that participate in the spread of
the 1,000 most viral articles. After articles from The Onion are excluded, we
are left with 42,202 tweets from 13,926 accounts. We align the times when each
link first appears. We focus on a one-hour early spreading phase following each
of these events, and divide it into logarithmic lag intervals. The plot shows the
bot score distribution for accounts sharing the links during each of these lag
intervals.
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Figure 18: Average number of followers for Twitter users who are mentioned
(or replied to) by a sample of 20,000 accounts that link to the 1,000 most viral
articles from consensus low-credibility sources. We obtained bot scores for 4,006
unique mentioning accounts and 4,965 unique mentioned accounts, participating
in 33,112 mention/reply pairs. We excluded 13,817 of these pairs using the “via
@screen name” mentioning pattern. The mentioning accounts are aggregated
into three groups by bot score percentile. Error bars indicate standard errors.
Inset: Distributions of follower counts for users mentioned by accounts in each
percentile group.
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Figure 19: Joint distribution of the bot scores of accounts that retweeted links to
articles from consensus low-credibility sources and accounts that had originally
posted the links. We considered retweets by a sample of 20,000 accounts that
posted the 1,000 most viral articles. We obtained bot scores for 12,792 tweeting
accounts and 17,664 retweeting accounts, participating in 229,725 retweet pairs.
Color represents the number of retweeted messages in each bin, on a log scale.
Projections show the distributions of bot scores for retweeters (top) and for
accounts retweeted by likely humans (left).
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Figure 20: Distributions of bot scores versus account activity. For this analysis
we randomly selected 48,517 distinct Twitter accounts evaluated by Botometer.
Of these, 11,190 were available for crawling their profiles and measuring their
activity (number of tweets). Bins correspond to deciles in the activity rate. We
show the average and 95% confidence interval for the bot score distribution of
the accounts in each activity bin. There is no correlation between activity and
bot score (Pearson’s ρ = −0.007).
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these accounts still get high bot scores. Figure 20 confirms that account activity
volume and bot scores are uncorrelated.
Bot-score threshold values
The results are also not affected by the use of different bot-score thresholds to
separate social bots and human accounts. For example, we experimented with
different thresholds and found that they do not change our conclusions that
super-spreaders are more likely to be social bots. Figs. 13 and 14 and Table 3
show that other findings are also robust with respect to the bot score threshold,
even though the estimated percentages of likely humans/bots, and the estimated
numbers of tweets posted by them, are naturally sensitive to the threshold.
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